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Abstract
We propose a formulation of a general-sum bimatrix game
as a bipartite directed graph with the objective of establish-
ing a correspondence between the set of the relevant struc-
tures of the graph (in particular elementary cycles) and the
set of the Nash equilibria of the game. We show that finding
the set of elementary cycles of the graph permits the compu-
tation of the set of equilibria. For games whose graphs have
a sparse adjacency matrix, this serves as a good heuristic
for computing the set of equilibria. The heuristic also al-
lows the discarding of sections of the support space that
do not yield any equilibrium, thus serving as a useful pre-
processing step for algorithms that compute the equilibria
through support enumeration.
1 Introduction
Game theory is the study of strategic decision-making. The
decision-makers are called players. In bimatrix games, only
2 players are involved. Each player makes one decision in
the game. This decision pertains to the probability distribu-
tion the player conceives over the set of strategies available
to him. As a function of the two decisions, each player re-
ceives a real-valued number, called his payoff. When each
player tries to maximize his own payoff, their decisions
form an equilibrium in which neither player can increase
his own payoff by changing his own decision given that the
other player sticks to his part of the pair. Using Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem, John Nash [8] proved the existence of
such an equilibrium, since named after him, for every finite
game. It is equally true that a game may have more than one
such equilibrium.
The problem of determining the Nash equilibria of a game
has occupied much of research in computational game the-
ory (see [6], [13] for excellent surveys). The principle algo-
rithm for finding a Nash equilibrium of a general-sum game
is the Lemke-Howson algorithm ([4], [5]). It solves a linear
complementarity program (LCP) formulation of the game.
While in practice this algorithm is quite efficient, its worst
case complexity is exponential [11]. Despite its age, the al-
gorithm remains the state of the art.
Heuristics about the game structure, therefore, invite inter-
est in finding a sample Nash equilibrium, particularly when
the game is large-sized. It is well-understood that most
randomly-generated games allow an equilibrium with small
and balanced supports 1. There is theoretical and empir-
ical evidence that in randomly generated bimatrix games
([7]) as n, the size of the game increases, the probability
of the game having an equilibrium where each player’s sup-
port has size n becomes vanishingly small. This heuris-
tic is also used by [2] and [10] who use a much simpler
algorithm than the Lemke-Howson to find a sample Nash
equilibrium. Their algorithm enumerate all support pairs
(starting with the smallest-sized ones), and checks if a Nash
equilibrium can be formed from a given support pair. In
[10] it is reporter that in exhaustive computational experi-
ence on a variety of games, this algorithm outperforms the
Lemke-Howson in finding one Nash equilibrium [10].
In this paper, we investigate the larger problem of defin-
ing a good heuristic for computing the set equilibria. Our
approach in general shall be of support enumeration. Our
contribution to this line of research is that we formulate the
bimatrix game as a bipartite directed graph that captures the
inter-dependencies of the strategies of the game. We term
this graph as the dominance graph of the game. We then
establish a correspondence between the set of elementary
structures of the graph and the set of the equilibria of the
game. In particular, we show that the set of the elementary
cycles of the graph is sufficient to compute the set of equi-
libria. Roughly speaking, we equate a cycle with a support
pair. This heuristic also allows us to discard certain portions
of support space that will never yield a Nash equilibrium.
The motivation for this approach is that graph theory has
a predictably large body of work on finding the set of the
relevant structures of the graph. For example, efficient
1A support is a subset of strategies that the player uses with positive
probability; balanced here implies that the support size of both players is
equal
linear-time algorithms that find the set of elementary cy-
cles ([3])or strongly connected components ([12], for large-
sized, sparsely connected graphs have been known for quite
some time.
While support enumeration is a simpler technique to imple-
ment than the Lemke-Howson (a given pair of supports can
be checked in polynomial time via a linear program if it
yields a Nash equilibrium or not), we do state the following
caveats. First, enumerative methods of LCPs are in general
faster than support enumeration ([13], [6], [1]) and they re-
quire less memory storage. Second, a potential drawback
of our approach is that if the dominance graph is not sparse,
the number of elementary cycles increases faster (with the
game size) than support enumeration. Thirdly, no efficient
algorithm is known that computes only the pair-wise dis-
tinct elementary cycles of a graph. Since two or more cycles
composed of the same vertices but in different order could
be elementary, there would clearly be a waste if the set of
elementary cycles is computed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we define bimatrix games, their solutions as well as the
support enumeration approach. Then in Section 3 we define
the formulation the game as a bipartite digraph. In Section
4 we establish some results about the correspondence be-
tween the structures of the graph and the set of equilibria.
Then, in Section 5, we discuss methods of finding the set
of elementary cycles. We also show how the dominance
graph can be feasibly constructed using a more generalized
formulation. Finally in Section 6, we summarize this work
and discuss its future direction.
2 Bimatrix Game
In this section we recall standard definitions from game the-
ory. A bimatrix game g (henceforth, game) is played by two
players called player 1 and player 2 respectively, and is de-
fined by four elements g = (M,N,A,B). M and N are
the strategy sets of players 1 and 2 respectively. Strategies
in M and N are also called pure strategies. Player 1 has m
pure strategies and player 2 has n pure strategies. A and B
are m × n matrices and are called respectively player 1’s
and player 2’s payoff matrix. If player 1 chooses strategy
x ∈ M and player 2 chooses y ∈ N , player 1 receives the
entry Axy as payoff and player 2 receives the entry Bxy as
payoff.
Notice. Henceforth, for convenience, we shall be give defi-
nitions and notations only for player 1 that are also, by ob-
vious analogy, applicable to player 2, unless we state to the
contrary.
A mixed strategy p for player 1 is a m-column vector where
px represents the probability with which player 1 chooses
the strategy x ∈M . In a mixed strategy, pure strategies that
receive nonzero probability are said to be in its support. The
support of a mixed strategy p shall be denoted by sp. |sp|
denotes the size of the set sp. The set of mixed strategies of
player 1 shall be denoted by ∆(M).
Notice. Henceforth, unless specified otherwise: x shall de-
note a pure strategy in M and y a pure strategy in N , Ax
shall denote the xth row vector of A and By shall denote
the yth column vector of B. p shall denote a mixed strat-
egy from the set ∆(M) and q a mixed strategy from the set
∆(N).
2.1 Dominated Strategies
Strategy x is said to be a best response to the strategy y if, ∀
x′ ∈ M\{x}, Axy ≥ Ax′y . x is said to be a best response
to a mixed strategy q ∈ ∆(N), if ∀ x′ ∈ M\{x}, Ax · q ≥
Ax′ · q. Given a mixed strategy q, the set of pure strategies
that are a best response to q is denoted by BR(q). Finally,
the mixed strategy p is said to a best response to the mixed
strategy q, if ∀ r ∈ ∆(M)\{p}, pT ·A ·q ≥ rT ·A ·q. Given
two strategies, a and b, pure or mixed, we shall use a → b,
to mean “a is a best response to b”.
A pure strategy that is not a best response to any pure or
mixed strategy is called strictly dominated. Formally, x is
strictly dominated, if ∀ q ∈ ∆(N), ∃ x′ ∈ M\{x}, such
that Ax′ · q > Ax · q. The set of strategies of a player can
be made smaller by removing from it all strictly dominated
strategies. The following linear program LP1 checks if the
pure strategy x is strictly dominated or not.
LP1:
variables: ∀y ∈ N , qy; ǫ
maximize: ǫ
subject to:
1.
∑
y∈N
Ax′yqy + ǫ ≤
∑
y∈N
Axyqy, ∀x
′ ∈M\{x}
2.
∑
y∈N
qy = 1
3. qy ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ N
If LP1 has a feasible solution and ǫ < 0, then x is strictly
dominated. In other words, if x is not strictly dominated,
there exists a mixed strategy q (obtained from the q values
in LP1) such that x → q. For strictly dominated strategies
no such q exists. Henceforth, we assume that from the sets
M and N strictly dominated strategies have been removed
by the path-independent process of the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
We now recall two equivalent definitions of Nash equilib-
rium [8], the central solution concept in game theory.
Definition 1 The mixed strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equi-
librium, if for every mixed strategy p′ 6= p of player 1 and
every mixed strategy q′ 6= q of player 2,
pT · A · q ≥ p′T · A · q
pT · B · p ≥ pT · B · q′
Thus, if player 2 is playing q, player 1 cannot improve his
payoff by playing a mixed strategy different than p. This is
analogously true for player 2 as well. The following theo-
rem ([8]) leads to an equivalent definition of Nash equilib-
rium.
Theorem 1 The mixed strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equi-
librium, iff ∀ x ∈ sp, x→ q and ∀ y ∈ sq , y → p.
Thus, in the Nash equilibrium (p, q), the expected payoff to
player 1 on playing any pure strategy x ∈ sp when player 2
chooses his pure strategies according to q is the same, and
the expected payoff to player 1 may be lesser if he uses a
pure strategy that lies outside sp. This is analogously true
for player 2 as well. This implies that strictly dominated
strategies cannot be used in the support of any Nash equi-
librium. A Nash equilibrium can be defined in these terms.
Definition 2 The mixed strategy pair (p, q) with supports
sp and sq respectively is a Nash equilibrium if:
ATx · q = u1, ∀x ∈ sp
ATx′ · q ≤ u1, ∀x
′ ∈M\sp
pT · By = u2, ∀y ∈ sq
pT · By′ ≤ u2, ∀y
′ ∈ N\sq
u1 and u2 are the expected payoffs for player 1 and player
2 respectively for playing the mixed strategies (p, q).
2.3 Non-Degenerate Games
A game is said to be non-degenerate if for every mixed strat-
egy, the number of pure strategies that are a best response
to it is less than or equal to the size of its support. Formally,
Definition 3 Let g = (M,N,A,B) be a bimatrix game. If
for every mixed strategy p ∈ ∆(M) and for every mixed
strategy q ∈ ∆(N), |BR(p)| ≤ |sp| and |BR(q)| ≤ |sq|,
then g is said to be a non-degenerate game.
A straightforward corollary due to Definition 3 is as follows.
Corollary 1 If (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium of a non-
degenerate game g, then |sp| = |sq| (the supports are said
to be balanced).
2.4 Computing Equilibria using Support
Enumeration
Since the set of mixed strategies of each player is an infi-
nite one, the set of Nash equilibria may be an infinite one.
For example, in a two-strategy per player game, where the
payoff matrices are both the identity matrix, every mixed
strategy of one player forms a Nash equilibrium with ev-
ery mixed strategy of the other player (although the payoffs
will be same for every pair). We are therefore interested in
determining a subset Ω of Nash equilibria that we define as
follows. Let P (M) and P (N) denote the power sets of M
and N respectively.
Definition 4 Let g = (M,N,A,B) be a game. Then, Ω =
{s : s ∈ P (M)×P (N), ∃ (p, q) such that sp ∪ sq = s and
(p, q) is a Nash equilibrium }.
We are thus interested in determining all the support set
pairs that form a Nash equilibrium. Definition 2 can be di-
rectly converted into what [10] call a feasibility program,
which is a linear program that accepts as arguments two
support sets, sp ⊆ M and sq ⊆ N , and checks if they
constitute a Nash equilibrium or not. Since the game in-
volves only two players, the constraints in Definition 2 are
all linear. We denote the linear program corresponding to
Definition 2 by FP1. A simple algorithm to compute Ω
is to run FP1 for every pair (sp, sq), where sp ∈ P (M)
and sq ∈ P (N). There are (2m − 1)(2n − 1) elements
in P (M) × P (N) and hence this algorithm becomes in-
tractable as m or n grows.
3 Dominance Graph of the Game
We now develop our idea of deriving a graph from the game
g that in such a way that the graph’s relevant structural prop-
erties (in particular, the number of its elementary cycles)
serve as a good heuristic to compute Ω. We call this graph
the game’s dominance graph. Each pure strategy is a vertex
in this graph. The graph’s adjacency matrix is based on two
kinds of sets that we call the domain and the relevancy set
respectively of each pure strategy. We describe these con-
cepts and the construction of the graph in this section. The
central idea of the construction is that the elements of these
two sets represent the vertices of the graph.
3.1 Domain D(x)
Theorem 1 says that in a Nash equilibrium mixed strategy
pair, each pure strategy of a player is a best response to the
other player’s mixed strategy. Therefore a starting point to
compute Ω, is to compute for each pure strategy of a player,
the set of the mixed strategies to which the pure strategy is a
best response. We define the domain of x, denoted byD(x),
to be the set of subsets of N , such that from every element
in D(x), a mixed strategy can be formulated to which x is
a best response.
Definition 5 The domain of strategy x is the set D(x) =
{s : s ⊆ N , ∃ q such that sq = s and x→ q}
A strategy x that is not strictly dominated may have upto
2n−1 elements (subsets ofN ) in its domain. The domain of
a strategy x can be computed by enumerating the elements
of the power set ofN and checking them individually to see
if they belong to D(x). We can check via linear program-
ming if, given s1, s0 ⊆ N , there exists a mixed strategy q
such that x→ q and ∀ j ∈ s1, qj > 0 and ∀ k ∈ s0, qk = 0.
The linear program LP2 corresponds to this check. It takes
as arguments the sets s1, s0.
LP2(s1, s0):
variables: ∀y ∈ N , qy; ǫ
maximize: ǫ
subject to:
1.
∑
y∈N
Ax′yqy ≤
∑
y∈N
Axyqy , ∀x
′ ∈M\{x}
2.
∑
y∈N
qy = 1
3. qj ≥ ǫ, ∀j ∈ s1
4. qk = 0, ∀k ∈ s0
Only if LP2 has a feasible solution and ǫ > 0, is it true
that there exists a mixed strategy q such that x → q, and ∀
j ∈ s1, qj > 0 and ∀ k ∈ s0, qk = 0. This mixed strategy
is obtained from the values of the variables qy (which are
the probabilities of pure strategies y). Strictly dominated
strategies have empty domains.
D(x) can be computed by enumerating the elements of
P (N), the power set of N , and executing LP2(s1, s0) for
each element s ∈ P (N) setting s1 = s and s0 = (N − s).
The computation of D(x) of each x ∈M requires (2n − 1)
runs of LP2. In non-degenerate games, the number LP2
runs can be reduced somewhat by keeping track of (x, q)
pairs where sq ∈ D(x). For example, if |sq| = 2, and
we have determined that sq ∈ D(x), then we do not need
to run LP2(sq, N\sq) after having found another x′ with
sq ∈ D(x
′).
3.2 Relevancy Set R(x)
The computation ofD(x) becomes intractable for large val-
ues of n. Besides, the size of D(x) might be too large.
Therefore to useD(x) of each x to obtain the adjacency ma-
trix of the graph is impractical. In Section 5.1 we discuss
how a subset of D(x) containing supports of small sizes
only can be used to construct the graph. The measure that
we shall therefore use to construct the graph is what we term
as the relevancy set of x, denoted by R(x). It is the set of
the pure strategies of player 2 such that every strategy in
R(x) is in the support of some mixed strategy to which x is
a best response.
Definition 6 The relevancy set of strategy x is the set
R(x) = {y : y ∈ N , ∃ q such that qy > 0 and x→ q}
Thus, the relevancy set of x is just the union of the elements
of D(x). The worst-case (as well as best-case) complexity
of computing D(x) is exponential. While computing R(x)
has this same worst-case complexity, its best-case complex-
ity is much lower. We describe one method of computing
R(x) that works quite well in practice.
By the definition of the relevancy set, R(x) is non-empty
iff x is non-strictly dominated. We now show how to de-
termine if a strategy y∗ ∈ N is an element of R(x). In
LP1, we make two modifications: we change constraint 3.,
to qy ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ N\{y∗}, and we add the constraint, qy∗ =
0. We call this LP, Mod LP1.
If x is non-strictly dominated then ǫ ≥ 0 in LP1. There-
fore, if in Mod LP1 (which is the same as LP1 but with
qy∗ = 0), ǫ < 0, then it implies that x is now strictly domi-
nated only because player 2 plays y∗ with zero probability.
In other words, only by re-setting qy∗ ≥ 0, we establish
that there exists a mixed strategy q of player 2 in which he
plays qy∗ with non-zero probability, to which x is a best re-
sponse. Thus, we conclude that if ǫ < 0 in Mod LP1, then
y∗ ∈ R(x).
However, if ǫ ≥ 0, it does not rule out that y∗ could still be
in R(x). By executing Mod LP1 n times, each time taking
a different strategy from N , we might obtain only a subset
of R(x). Assume that this set is R′(x) ⊂ N . To determine
R(x) given R′(x), we need to execute LP2 for either all the
pairs (s1, s0) (where s1 takes on values from the power set
of N −R′(x) and s0, from the power set of R′(x)) or until
R(x) = N . 2
In view of the worst-case complexity of computing R(x),
for the purpose of the present discussion we make the fol-
lowing simplifying assumption.
Assumption 1 ∀ x ∈ M , R(x) = N , and ∀ y ∈ N ,
R(y) =M .
This assumption does not affect any of the theoretical re-
sults we give, but only affects our ability to construct the
graph, an issue we address in Section 5.1. As a matter of
fact, in practice, we have found that executing Mod LP1
on randomly generated bimatrix games, n times for each
x, almost always gives us R(x) = N . Our use ofR(x) to
describe a graph in the following is purely for expository
reasons. Theorem 1 and Definition 6 give us the following
simple corollary.
2Other methods too exist for this purpose. For example, if x is not
strictly dominated, LP1 will return a set of pure strategies of player 2 that
are in R(x). Therefore, only those not found by LP1 need to be iteratively
checked by LP2.
Corollary 2 If (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium of a game g,
then sq ⊆ R(x) for every x ∈ sp and sp ⊆ R(y) for every
y ∈ sq.
3.3 Dominance Graph based on R(x)
The relevancy sets R(x) of each x ∈ M , and R(y) of
each y ∈ N as well as the sets M and N lend a certain
structure to the game that can be formulated as a bipartite
directed graph or digraph. A bipartite digraph is a tuple
G = (U,W,E), where U , W are finite disjoint sets, and
E is a |U | × |W | matrix called the adjacency matrix or the
arc set such that Euw = 1 if an arc exists from u ∈ U to
w ∈ W , and 0 otherwise. We say that the arc (u,w) ∈ E,
if Euw = 1. The vertex set of G is the union of U and W .
By setting U = M and W = N , and defining E such
that Exy = 1 iff y ∈ R(x) and 0 otherwise, we obtain
the dominance graph of the game g, the bipartite digraph
Gr = (M,N,E). The vertex set of Gr is denoted by
V = M ∪N . Thus for every arc in E, one endpoint lies in
M and the other in N or vice-versa. Gr is a 1-graph, hence
between every ordered pair of vertices, not more than one
arc exists.
A bipartite digraph G = (U,W,E) is said to be com-
pletely connected if for every vertex u ∈ U and every vertex
w ∈ W , the arcs (u,w) and (w, u) exist in E. Note that if
Assumption 1 is made, Gr is completely connected. In a
digraph, the out-degree of a vertex v, denoted by O(v) is
the number of arcs emanating from the vertex, while the in-
degree of v, denoted by I(v) is the number of arcs entering
it. Note that in Gr, for each v ∈ V , O(v) ≥ 1, since the
relevancy set of each v is non-empty.
3.4 Support Cycle Basis
Some basic structural definitions from graph theory about
digraphs that we require to represent the equilibria of the
game g in terms of the digraph Gr are as follows:
We are given the digraph Gr as defined above. A path is
a sequence of vertices (v1 . . . , vk) such that ∀ 1 ≤ i < k,
the arc (vi, vi+1) exists in E. The first vertex v1 in the se-
quence is called the initial endpoint and the last vertex vk
is called the terminal endpoint. A cycle 3 is a path whose
initial endpoint is the same as its terminal endpoint. An
elementary (or simple) cycle is a cycle in which no vertex
(barring the initial endpoint) occurs twice. Note that a cy-
cle is a sequence of pure strategies where each strategy is
alternatively picked from the two strategy sets. The length
of a cycle is the number of vertices in it (not counting the
repeating vertex). A cycle of length k is called a k-cycle.
The longest cycle in Gr has 2K+1 vertices where K is the
size of the smaller of the two strategy sets, M and N . We
3sometimes also called a circuit, esp. in undirected graphs
denote the set of elementary cycles of Gr by CGr .
Henceforth, for convenience, we shall refer to elementary
cycles as cycles unless we state to the contrary. The set of
vertices that appear in a cycle µ is denoted by V (µ) and is
called its vertex set. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the set of vertices (pure
strategies) of player i in cycle µ is denoted by Vi(µ). Two
cycles µ, µ′ are called equivalent if V (µ) = V (µ′), else
they are said to be distinct. The set CGr of the elementary
cycles of Gr can be partitioned into equivalence classes,
V 1, . . . , V J such that any two cycles from the same class
are equivalent and any two cycles from different classes are
distinct. A class is represented by the vertex set of the cy-
cles that belong to that class. The cycles of a given class are
permutations of the vertices of that class.
To eventually be able to compute Ω, it is enough to know
how many equivalence classes there are in G and the defi-
nition (i.e., vertex set) of each class. It is not necessary to
compute the members of each class. By drawing one mem-
ber (any member) from each equivalence class, we obtain a
set of pairwise distinct cycles. We define the support cycle
basis of Gr denoted by δGr as follows.
Definition 7 Let P (V ) denote the power set of V . The sup-
port cycle basis of Gr is the set δGr = {s : s ∈ P (V ), ∃
µ ∈ CGr , such that V (µ) = s}.
Thus each element of a support cycle basis (henceforth
called the cycle basis) 4 is a subset of V . There exists atleast
one cycle whose vertex set equals this subset. Naturally, it
may be possible that other cycles also exist whose vertex
set equals this subset. In the forthcoming discussion we de-
scribe a property of cycles that is such that if it is applicable
to one cycle, then it is also applicable to every cycle in that
cycle’s class. Thus we can refer without ambiguity to an el-
ement of δGr as a cycle as well a subset. As we shall see in
the next section, the cycle basis is important in formulating
Nash equilibria in graph-theoretic terms (note the certain
similitude between Definitions 4 and 7).
4 Expressing Equilibria as Cycles
We now discuss the motivation behind the preceding con-
structions, that of the dominance graph and the cycle ba-
sis. Our objective in using these two constructs is that they
might provide heuristics that enable the computation of the
equilibria set Ω more efficiently than comprehensive sup-
port pair enumeration. We first show how Nash equilibria
are related to elementary cycles.
We say that a mixed strategy (p, q) generates a given cycle
µ if V (µ) ⊆ (sp ∪ sq). We say that a cycle µ generates a
given mixed strategy (p, q) if sp = V1(µ) and sq = V2(µ).
4Not to be confused with the cycle basis of a graph which is a set of
fundamental cycles of the graph
Theorem 2 Let g be a game and Gr its dominance graph.
Then, for every Nash equilibrium (p, q) of g, there exists
atleast one cycle µ ∈ δGr of length 2K + 1 where K =
min(|sp|, |sq|), such that V (µ) ⊆ (sp ∪ sq). Moreover, if
|sp| = |sq|, then V (µ) = (sp ∪ sq).
Proof: Assume (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium of g. Denote sp
by s1 and sq by s2. ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, let Li be a stack in which
the elements of si have been pushed in any order. Let K
denote the size of the smaller of the two stacks and k the
subscript of that stack. Let µ be a list. The jth element
of µ is denoted by µj . Now, remove K elements from Lk
and L−k 5 each, and place them alternatively in µ with an
element of Lk being µ1. By Corollary 2, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀
u ∈ Li, s−i ⊆ R(u) and thus, ∀ v ∈ s−i, (u, v) ∈ E.
Therefore, for every 1 ≤ j < 2K , the arc (µj , µj+1) is an
element of E. Since, µ1 ∈ Lk and there are 2K elements
in µ, µ2K ∈ L−k. But the arc (µ2K , µ1) exists in E (by
Corollary 2). Therefore, adding the element µ1 at position
2K+1, gives us an elementary cycle, as claimed in the first
statement.
The vertex set of µ is Lk∪L−k(K), whereL−k(K) ⊆ L−k
such that |L−k(K)| = K . If (as in a non-degenerate game)
|Lk| = |L−k| = K , the elementary cycle µ, as constructed
above, has a vertex set that equalsLk∪L−k(K) =Lk∪L−k
as claimed in the second statement. QED.
Since the order in which the vertices are put in the stacks
does not matter in the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that
(p, q) generates every cycle of the class to which µ belongs.
This allows us, as stated before, to refer to an element of
δGr as a cycle as well as a subset. We can also refer to the
cycle generated by (p, q).
4.1 Support Trees
Theorem 2 implies that every Nash equilibrium of a game
generates a cycle. If the game is non-degenerate or if the
supports of the equilibrium are balanced, then the cycle also
generates the Nash equilibrium. In particular, every 3-cycle
of Gr generates a Nash equilibrium of g. We cannot gener-
alize this statement, however. That is, not every Nash equi-
librium of g can be generated by a cycle of size ≥ 5.
Corollary 3 Given a game g and its dominance graph Gr,
and a Nash equilibrium (p, q) of g that generates the cycle
µ ∈ δGr of length ≥ 5. Then it is possible that µ does not
generate (p, q), that is, it is possible that sp 6= V1(µ) or
sq 6= V2(µ).
Due to this corollary, it would appear that computing the
cycle basis may not be sufficient to compute the set of Nash
equilibria Ω. However, as we describe in the following,
5
−k denotes “not k”
while a cycle itself may not generate a particular equilib-
rium, a cycle and an auxiliary set of 3-cycles would gener-
ate that equilibrium. Note that every 3-cycle is necessarily
elementary.
Consider a mixed strategy (p, q) that is a Nash equilib-
rium. By Theorem 2 it generates a cycle. Let this cycle be
µ ∈ δGr . If |sp| = |sq| = K , then the cycle generates the
equilibrium as well. So, the case that requires generaliza-
tion is if |sp| 6= |sq|. Let |sp| < |sq|, and let s = sq −V2(µ)
(s contains the pure strategies in sq that have not been “used
up” in µ). By Corollary 2, for each v ∈ s, and for each
u ∈ V1(µ), the arcs (u, v) and (v, u) exist in E. Thus, each
element v ∈ s forms the cycle (v, u, v) with atleast one ver-
tex of u ∈ V1(µ).
Therefore, every Nash equilibrium (p, q) is such that the
union of its support sets equals the union of the vertex sets
of a set of cycles τ(p, q) where each cycle is from δGr . In
this set, there is a cycle µ of length 2K + 1 and some other
3-cycles, whose vertex sets have one element in common
with the vertex set of µ. We call this set of cycles a sup-
port tree (henceforth, tree) 6. We say that the mixed strategy
(p, q) generates the tree τ(p, q) if the latter is obtained is the
manner just described. Therefore if (p, q) generates τ(p, q),
(sa∪ sq) =
⋃
c∈τ(p,q)
V (c). Moreover, as in the case of cycles
and balanced supports, here τ(p, q) generates (p, q) as well.
We can thus find a tree of Gr that generates a given Nash
equilibrium (In the case of an equilibrium with balanced
supports, there are no 3-cycles in τ ).
Theorem 3 Let g be a game and Gr its dominance graph.
Every Nash equilibrium (p, q) of g generates atleast one
support tree τ(p, q) of Gr.
An important consequence of the two preceding theorems
is that, we can use them for deciding if a certain strategy
is eliminable i.e., it does not occur in the support of any
Nash equilibrium. More generally, we can use the theorems
to discard a subset of strategies, if we find that they do not
yield any cycle.
5 Computing the Support Cycle Basis
The two theorems of the last section establish that the set
of Nash equilibria Ω can be computed from the cycle ba-
sis only. So a general scheme to compute Ω that we call
support tree enumeration as follows. We first determine the
cycle basis δGr from CGr which also gives us all 3-cycles.
Denote the set of 3-cycles by δ3Gr , and by P
3 its power set.
The set of support trees is obtained by keeping those ele-
ments of (δGr − δ3Gr ) × P
3 that satisfy the definition of a
support tree. Finally, for each cycle or support tree µ found,
6A structure such as τ(p, q) is a tree of the underlying undirected graph
of Gr
we run FP1 with arguments V1(µ) and V2(µ).
The cycle basis is just a set of cycles of Gr . The problem of
determining the set of elementary cycles of a directed graph
is a well studied one in graph theory. To our knowledge,
the algorithm due to Johnson [3] is the most efficient in this
regard. Its run-time is bounded by O((v+e)(c+1)), where
v is the number of vertices, e the number of arcs and c the
number of elementary cycles of the graph. It computes the
set CGr . We do not know of any algorithm that computes
efficiently the subset δGr of CGr .
Johnson’s algorithm detects the strongly connected compo-
nents (SCCs) of a digraph G and then finds all the elemen-
tary cycle of each SCC. An SCC is a subset V ′ of the ver-
tices of G such that for every pair of vertices u, v,∈ V ′
there exists an elementary path of vertices of V ′ such that
its initial endpoint is u and terminal endpoint is v. There
exist efficient, linear-time algorithms that find all the SCCs
of digraph. The efficiency of Johnson’s algorithm depends
on the density of the matrix E (and on the number of SCCs;
the more SCCs, the better it is).
A completely connected bipartite graph has just one SCC
and has the maximum number of elementary cycles that
a graph of its size (in the number of vertices, say k) can
have. This number ([3]), grows, faster than the number
of total supports of the game as k grows. Therefore, con-
structing Gr by making Assumption 1 and then enumerat-
ing its cycles using Johnson’s algorithm (or any other) is
guaranteed to be worse than enumerating the elements of
P (M) × P (N). On the other hand, as noted before, R(x)
is difficult to compute as well.
So, we would like to construct a graph without the (forced)
complete connectedness ofGr but without actually comput-
ing Rx. Moreover, we would like Theorems 2 and 3 to be
true for this graph as well. We now describe how a graph
that is based on D(x) can satisfy these criteria.
5.1 Dominance Graph based on D(x)
We define a dominance graph based on the domain, denoted
by Gd as the bipartite digraph Gd = (P (M), P (N), E). In
this graph a vertex is an element of the power set of the
set of pure strategies and thus corresponds to either a pure
strategy or to a set of pure strategies. In Gd an arc is made
from a vertex s to the vertex t, if every pure strategy in s
is a best response to some mixed strategy with support t.
Thus, given s ∈ P (M) and t ∈ P (N), Est = 1, iff, ∀
x ∈ s, t ∈ D(x). Using Theorem 1, it can be verified that
all 3-cycles of Gd are Nash equilibria, just as the 3-cycles
of Gr are. Additionally, in Gd only 3-cycles generate Nash
equilibria. Cycles of longer lengths need not be considered.
It is easy to see the motivation behind the construction of
Gd. Even if the sets R(x) are considered as given, Gr con-
tains a lot of superfluous information in terms of the arcs it
contains. For example, let x be a vertex in Gr, and let the
arcs (x, y) and (x,w) exist in E of Gr. Suppose that x is
not a best response to y, x is not a best response to w but
(y, w) ∈ D(x). This implies, that x is a best response to a
mixed strategy q that has in its support y, if and only if w
(or some other pure strategies) also occur in the support. A
graph such as Gd contains more precise information.
Thus on the one hand, we have the small but quasi-
completely connected graph Gr, and on the other, the very
large, but possibly sparsely connected graph Gd. We can
therefore seek to construct a dominance graph that is an in-
termediate between Gr and Gd. The intermediacy is in the
size of the two vertex sets of Gi. In Gd, they are P (M)
and P (N). In general, they can be any subsets of P (M)
and P (N). We define an intermediate graph denoted by
Gi as Gi = (Pk(M), Pl(N), E) where Pk(M) ∈ P (M)
consists only of elements of P (M) of size k or less and
Pl(N) ∈ P (N) consists only of elements of P (N) of size
l or less. The definition of E requires some care. Given
an s ∈ Pk(M) we define all the outgoing arcs from s as
follows. (by analogy, the following discussion is also ap-
plicable for every t ∈ Pl(N) ). Let Dl(x) ⊆ D(x) denote
the subset of the domain of x such that its elements are of
size l or less. For example, the D2(x) can contain only pure
strategies and pairs of pure strategies from N . Let S(v) de-
note the set of pure strategies in the vertex v and L(v) the
size of S(v). Then,
1. Let T (s) = {t ∈ Pl(N) : ∀ x ∈ s, t ∈ Dl(x)}. Then,
∀ t ∈ T (s), Est = 1
2. If T (s) is empty, let D(s) = {t ∈ Pl(N) : S(t) =⋂
x∈s
Dl(x)}. Then, ∀ t such that t = argmax
L(w)
{w ∈
D(s)}, Est = 1.
3. If T (s) and D(s) are both empty, then ∀ t ∈
(
⋃
x∈s
Dl(x)), Est = 1.
4. If s = x (i.e., it is a pure strategy) and Dl(x) is empty,
then ∀ t ∈ Pl(N), Est = 1.
In Gd only Case 1 is needed. In Cases 2, 3 and 4, we are
creating artificial arcs. These are needed, since in Gi, we
disallow vertices v ∈ Pl(N) such that L(v) > l. Thus, it
is possible that for a given s, there is no outgoing arc (the
vertex is isolated) using just Case 1. This would happen ei-
ther because Dl(x) is empty for some x ∈ s or that none of
x in s have a common element in their domains Dl. Hence
we need Cases 2, 3 and 4. If the values of l is small, the
computation of Dl(x) is tractable. The intuition behind the
definition of E above, is that in most games even for small
values of l, Cases 2, 3 and 4 are not needed, and hence artifi-
cial arcs (that introduce artificial cycles into Gi) need not be
made. We define a support tree τ of Gi to be a set of cycles
Table 1. Average size of δGr in random bima-
trix games of sizes 7 to 11. S = P (M)× P (N)
m = n = 7 8 9 10 11
|δGr | 757 3775 11772 48768 252567
|δGr |/|S| 0.04 0.058 0.045 0.046 0.06
T (secs) < 1 < 1 5.3 9.8 67
such that each pair of cycles in it has one vertex in common.
The definition of Gi leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Given an intermediate dominance graph Gi =
(Pk(M), Pl(N), E) of a game g, every Nash equilibrium
(p, q) of g generates atleast one support tree τ of Gi and τ
generates (p, q) as well.
We summarize a general scheme to compute the set Ω as
follows. For players 1 and 2, we set the values k and l
respectively, to fix the sizes of Pk(M) and Pl(N). Then,
using LP2, we compute ∀ x ∈M , ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Di(x), and
∀ y ∈ N , ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ l, Di(y). We then fill the entries of the
matrix E as described in Section 5.1 to obtain the graph Gi.
We then use an elementary cycle-finding algorithm such as
[3] to get the cycle basis of Gi. We then find sets of cycles
from δGi that contain pairwise intersecting cycles. Then the
program FP1 is run for each such set to obtain Ω.
5.2 Results
Table 1 shows some preliminary results (the games were
generated by the GAMUT software [9]) about the sizes of
the cycle basis in Gr. The relevancy sets were obtained
through Mod LP2, and in fact in all cases, the relevancy sets
equaled the other player’s strategy set. We did not use John-
son’s algorithm since it does not directly compute the cycle
basis. For our purpose, we have conceived a simple enu-
merating algorithm that builds elementary cycles of length
k + 1 from those of length k. The different cycle lengths to
be considered are k = 3, 4, . . . (2K + 1). Each elementary
k-cycle of length k is stored in a vector. Before storing, the
vertices are sorted, and converted into a number using a cod-
ing scheme. In the first step, all 3-cycles are computed by
a simple search. When searching for a (k + 1)-cycle from
a k-cycle, an expansion is done (using fixed look-ahead)
only if the resulting cycle is not already present in the set
of (k + 1)-cycles. We also conducted several experiments
to generate statistics about the domain set for a variety of
10×10 games using GAMUT. We do not report our findings
here for want of space, but we do mention that (predictably)
for random games, the adjacency matrix ofGd is very dense
(about 65% of entries are 1). Games with sparse matrices
were “WarOfAttrition”(15%), “LocationGame”(10%) and
“GuessTwoThirdsAve”(15%) among others.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a heuristic for the computation of the
set of equilibria of bimatrix games as well as for identifying
eliminable strategies (those that are not in any Nash equilib-
rium). We have formulated the heuristic in graph-theoretic
terms with the idea that certain games can be converted to
sparsely connected digraphs, which can then be mined for
interesting structures. In this paper, we showed that we can
re-design a game to be a digraph whose elementary cycles
can be checked directly to see if they yield Nash equilibria.
The bulk of the paper concerned graphs conceived with the
relevancy set. As we stated, Gr was used mainly for exposi-
tory purposes. Our immediate work concerns more focused
computational experience with intermediate graphs Gi. At
the present time, there are not many approaches in the liter-
ature for computing the set of Nash equilibria, and we hope
that our approach is a useful contribution.
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